Pearl Harbor as “New History:” Japanese-American Relations, 1938–1941, and the Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho by Mauch Peter
The title comprises a wordplay that might not be immediately obvious to readers.  It
draws on two works —— Columbia University Press’s Pearl Harbor as History and Atarashii
Rekishi Kyo¯kasho (New History Textbook ) —— whose basic outlooks deserve comparison at this
essay’s outset. 1) On the one hand, Pearl Harbor as History —— whose extraordinary depth
and richness of analysis remains a benchmark for scholars today —— proceeded on the
assumption that Japanese-American relations were “a two-way street that had constantly
to be looked at from both ends.” 2) On the other hand, Atarashii Rekishi Kyo¯kasho (ARK ) ——
penned as a junior high school textbook rather than as an academic exercise —— was
fueled by the perception that, “each nation has its own perception of history, which
differs from those of other nations.  It is impossible for nations to share historical
perceptions.” 3) Of course, a junior high school textbook cannot be held to the same
scholarly standards as an academic text.  Even so, the discrepancy in these two books’
basic outlooks remains instructive, and in fact can be likened to two poles that inform the
parameters of this essay.
In a nutshell, ARK exists less to educate than it does to inculcate a sense of national
pride amongst Japanese youth.  Although it would have been unwieldy, the title of this
essay might more accurately have read: This is an essay about how ARK presents
distortions, half-truths, and falsehoods as historical education.  It is an essay about how
ARK ’s authors have not only rejected the interpretations of professional historians but
dispensed with all standards of historical objectivity.  Finally, it is an essay aimed
ultimately at revealing this chicanery for what it really is, particularly as it relates to the
textbook’s presentation of Japanese-American relations from 1938 to 1941.
These are serious charges to lay at the feet of a junior high school textbook and its
authors.  Such charges are all the more disturbing because, to borrow the words of
historians Laura Hein and Mark Selden: “Textbooks are important vehicles through
which contemporary societies transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and
the promised future of the community.” 4) ARK is no exception.  Clearly it is not just a
textbook.  Indeed, unlike other junior high school textbooks in Japan, ARK was also
published for public consumption.  Once in the public realm, the controversy
surrounding ARK ’s publication (as well as the text’s relative simplicity) ensured that it
reached the hands of otherwise disinterested onlookers around the nation.  In this way,
ARK represented an active attempt to mould a public memory of Japan’s modern
experience, and in particular of World War II.  Herein lies ARK ’s ultimate significance,
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for, as historian Akira Iriye has observed, “the nation as a whole has failed to develop a
coherent picture, a public memory, of the war.” 5)
Who are ARK ’s authors?  They are the kernel of a nationwide movement known as the
Atarashii Rekishi Kyo¯kasho o Tsukurukai ( Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, or
Tsukurukai for short).  The contributing authors to ARK numbered thirteen, and included
Nishio Kanji, a specialist on German literature at Electro-Communications University,
Fujioka Nobukatsu, a professor of education at the University of Tokyo, and Sakamoto
Takao, a professor of political science at Gakushu¯in University. 6) The principal historian
within their ranks was (and remains) University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Ito¯ Takashi.
Born in 1932, Ito¯ as a young man was a member of Japan’s Communist Party.  He left the
Communist Part in the early 1960s, and for decades thereafter stressed the importance of
scholarship beholden to no political ideology.  Since the early 1990s his political
philosophy has moved discernibly to the right, and his Tsukurukai membership suggests
that he no longer recognizes the virtue of politically neutral scholarship. 7) In any case, the
Tsukurukai ’s self-professed aims are grandiose: “For the purpose of Japanese children
living in the twenty-first century, we decided to create a new textbook and to
fundamentally renovate history education.” 8)
What, then, are the Tsukurukai rallying against?  “Postwar history education is
something which has made us ... lose pride in being Japanese,” they explain.  “Particularly
in terms of contemporary history, we are treated like criminals who are destined to
continue apologizing for posterity.” 9) The Tsukurukai believe the roots underlying this
problem exist at various levels.  At one level, it is less about scholarship or education than
it is about politics.  This is hardly surprising, for the Japanese Government’s practice of
directly supervising and censoring textbooks places history —— and particularly the
authorship of history textbooks —— squarely in the political realm.  As historian Ian Nish
put it: “The history of the twentieth century has become a highly politicized issue in
Japan.” 10) For their part, the Tsukurukai charge the Japanese Government in recent
decades with having displayed an overly sympathetic ear to “persistent Korean-Chinese
objections” to Japanese textbook content.  In particular, the Tsukurukai lament Tokyo’s
insistence on prioritizing “international understanding and cooperation” over and above
protecting Japan’s purportedly sovereign prerogative in writing its own textbooks.  This,
they argue, has merely encouraged further foreign protests over textbook content, forcing
the government to “yield” ever further to “foreign pressure.”  In the end result, this
vicious cycle has “invited a flood of masochistic textbooks.” 11) Seen in this light, ARK ’s
effort to redress Japan’s supposed “submission” to other nation’s “perceptions of history”
is an unapologetic political act. 12)
At another inter-linked level, the Tsukurukai are rallying against what they perceive to
be academic or educational issues.  They maintain that those textbooks which have
“yielded” to foreign pressure are predicated on two distinct views of Japanese history,
both of which assume that war guilt rests solely with the Japanese.  On the one hand, they
charge “socialism’s illusory historical view” with having depicted the “nation-state formed
during the Meiji period as an evil one, and condemn all of Japan’s modern history ... as a
succession of criminal acts.” 13) On the other hand, the Tsukurukai charge the so-called
“Tokyo Trials’ historical view” with having imbued Japanese youth with “the supposition
that World War II was a just and victorious war between ... United States-British
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democracy and Japanese-German fascism.” 14) Suffice it here to note that the Tsukurukai ’s
rejection of these two historical viewpoints neatly reflects a historiographical trend that
emerged in Japan in the 1960s, when Japanese historians challenged the hitherto
overwhelming influence of both Marxist scholarship and the Tokyo Trials. 15)
The Tsukurukai ’s agreement with the wider historical community does not however go
much beyond this most basic of levels, for they reject criticism of almost any aspect of
Japan’s war.  This involves a blanket rejection of the findings of the wider historical
community.  In terms of the period under review, the Tsukurukai make the perverted case
that the Anglo-American nations bore almost sole responsibility for war.  To quote a
separate Tsukurukai publication (which notably did not have to undergo the scrutiny of the
Japanese Government’s so-called Textbook Authorization Committee, thereby affording
Nishio Kanji complete freedom to express his views): “America’s fighting spirit was not
something that came alive after Pearl Harbor.  Its fighting spirit had a long history, and
there is really no way of expressing it other than to say that in the end this is what
started the war.” 16) In presenting their case, the Tsukurukai have dispensed with both the
findings of other historians and all standards of historical objectivity.
Konoe’s New Order Proclamation and the American Response
Take for example, the first discernible point in ARK at which the Tsukurukai
reconstructs the origins of the war.  Subtitled “Japanese-American Relations Worsen,” this
section begins with Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s announcement on 3 November
1938 of the so-called “New East Asian Order.”  To quote from page 272:
In 1938 Prime Minister Konoe proclaimed the New East Asian Order in which he
suggested the formation of an economic bloc that united Japan, China, and
Manchuria.  This later developed into the slogan “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere” that included Southeast Asia. 17)
In presenting Konoe’s proclamation of a New East Asian Order, the Tsukurukai provide
their readers with neither background nor analysis.  No mention is made, for example, of
Konoe’s famous aite ni sezu address of 16 January 1938, in which he proclaimed that
henceforth his government would deal with Chiang Kai-shek only on the battlefield and
at the surrender table.  In neglecting to place Konoe’s “new order” proclamation in
such a perspective, the Tsukurukai are able to paint that proclamation as a benevolent
attempt to initiate reform throughout Asia.  It is as if they are acting as Konoe’s personal
spokesperson some seventy years after the event.  Whilst however the Tsukurukai have
neatly captured the public face that Konoe sought to present, there was much more to
Konoe’s statement.
Although we cannot expect most middle school students to make the following
connection —— and herein lies the problem —— Konoe’s proclamation of a “new order”
carried with it the implication that Japan was dispensing with the “old” or “pre-existing”
order.  What was this old order?  Established in the early 1920s at the so-called
Washington Conference, it was characterised by cooperation between the United States,
Great Britain, Japan, and the other powers in pursuit of their economic objectives in
China.  The old order’s emphasis on peaceful, economic expansion was underpinned by
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a promise amongst the powers to respect China’s sovereignty as well as the principle of
“equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory
of China.” 18) As ARK correctly notes, this meant that Japan at the Washington Conference
accepted in treaty form the traditional policies of the United States with regard to China. 19)
In return Japan obtained a measure of security vis-à-vis the United States that was
otherwise unattainable (although this was hotly disputed within naval circles), as well as
access to American capital and markets, which was deemed necessary to the nation’s
further development.  All things considered, the contemporary impression that Japan’s
chief delegate to the Washington Conference, Admiral Kato¯ Tomosaburo¯, had served his
country well seems justified.  In the words of one authority, “for Kato¯ ... the invitation to
the Washington Conference must have seemed a god-send.” 20) Not that the Tsukurukai
would have their readers believe this.  Although ARK is short on specifics, Nishio Kanji in
a separate publication accused those historians who look favourably upon the old order as
“thinking of their own national history from the American viewpoint.” 21)
In contrast to their willingness to criticise professional historians, the Tsukurukai are
loath to criticise Konoe’s “new order” statement.  This puts them in an incongruous
position, for Konoe’s statement put the rest of the world on notice that Japan finally had
rejected both the path of great power co-operation and the notion of China’s territorial
integrity.  Such a policy ensured that, unless it significantly changed its policy, Japan
would never emerge victorious from its ongoing war in China —— for it simply did not
have the resources to unilaterally bring China to its knees.  Herein lies the significance of
the Konoe proclamation, although it receives no treatment at the hands of the 
Tsukurukai. 22)
If the Tsukurukai ’s presentation of Konoe’s “new order” proclamation is misleading,
then their treatment of the American response is disingenuous.  To quote from page 272:
America set forth the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity and did not
recognise Japan’s creation of its own economic bloc.  America, which had been
tentatively neutral in the Sino-Japanese War, strongly opposed Konoe’s
announcement and came to support officially China’s Chiang Kai-Shek.  The conflict
that led to the Japanese-American War began directly from this point.
In 1939 America notified Japan that it would not extend the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
Commerce and Shipping.  Japan, which depended on trade with the United States
for many goods, gradually suffered economically.  In the Japanese Army the way of
thinking that a northward advance to dispose of the Russian threat was traditionally
strong.  But from this time the southern advance thesis of advancing into Southeast
Asia to acquire natural resources became strong.  However if Japan advanced into
Southeast Asia it would inevitably collide with France, the Netherlands, America,
and England, all of which had colonies there. 23)
In contrast to their treatment of Konoe’s “new order” proclamation, the Tsukurukai
proved entirely willing to analyse the American response.  Their analysis is however
objectionable on the grounds that it creates the impression of a far tougher stance on
Washington’s part than was actually the case, and in fact goes so far as to imply —— not at
all subtly —— that American actions led “directly” to the Japanese-American war.
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Underlying this deceit is an inability —— or unwillingness —— to distinguish between
American support for China and the American commitment to the Open Door.
The distinction —— however fine —— is an important one to make.  If (as the Tsukurukai
would have us believe) the United States supported China unequivocally, then it could
not but be implacably hostile to Japan, in which case a Japanese-American war was a near
inevitability.  This was patently not the case.  Indeed, American policymakers until Pearl
Harbor were agreed on the need to avoid a war with Japan —— if not on the means by
which this might be achieved —— in order to better concentrate their nation’s energies on
the proportionately greater threat of Nazi Germany.  In this way, American policy was
characterized by a commitment not to China per se, but to the self-same Open Door that
Japan had committed itself in solemn treaty form at the above-mentioned Washington
Conference.  As American ambassador Joseph C. Grew explained to his protagonists in
Tokyo following Konoe’s “new order” proclamation, the United States could not admit
the right of any one power to “prescribe ... the terms and conditions of a ‘new order’ in
areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the
agent of destiny in regard thereto.” 24) In other words, American policy derived less from
an attachment to China than it did from the perceived need to halt Japan’s aggressive
actions in that beleaguered country.
It is in this context that the American decision to end the two nations’ commercial
treaty should be seen.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on 26 July 1939 that
Japan was being given the mandatory six months’ notice of the abrogation of the two
nations’ commercial treaty.  This meant that the United States would be in a position in
January 1940 —— if it wished —— to impose trade sanctions on Japan.  Because Japan’s
economic well-being depended on close commercial relations with the United States, such
a step clarified American opposition to Japan’s policy of aggression.  At the same time,
however, the door to two nations’ trade had not been shut.  To borrow the words of
Herbert Feis: “The United States was committed to nothing final.” 25) The application ——
or non-application —— of sanctions would depend on subsequent Japanese actions.  In other
words, if Japan dropped its insistence on realizing its policy objectives through the use of
force and reaffirmed its commitment to the Open Door, then Japanese-American
conciliation remained a possibility.
As the foregoing suggests, American policy was predicated on the basic assumption
that any adjustment in diplomatic relations must necessarily result from Japanese
initiative.  This in no way resonates with the impression —— that of a tough American
policy that led “directly” to war with Japan —— which the Tsukurukai sought to leave
their readers.  This discrepancy between the historical reality and the Tsukurukai ’s
reconstruction of history renders the remainder of the above passage little more than an
uncritical acceptance of what historian Hata Ikuhiko has termed “the path toward certain
self -destruction.” 26) Notable for its absence in ARK ’s discussion of the debate over
northward or southward expansion is any mention of the mauling that Soviet forces in
1939 handed Japan’s Kwantung Army. 27) This was a decisive factor in quelling
enthusiasm for a northward advance and simultaneously turning attentions to the colonial
regions of Southeast Asia.  In an irony that apparently is lost on the Tsukurukai —— or
perhaps it is an irony from which the Tsukurukai sought to shield their readership —— the
foreign forces Japan would face should it advance southward would be organised and
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equipped far better than were the Russians in 1939.  Presumably, revealing this instance
of strategic myopia ran counter to the Tsukurukai ’s insistence that it was American
policies that led “directly” to the Japanese-American war.
The Tripartite Pact
As the subheading —— “The Blind Spot of the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Military
Pact” —— suggests, ARK ’s reading of Japan’s alliance relationship with Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy does present a reasonably critical view of this aspect of Japanese diplomacy.
Even so, in light of the Tsukurukai ’s selective —— and distorted —— reconstruction of
Japanese-American relations in the aftermath of Konoe’s “new order” proclamation (as
discussed above), the account does not go nearly far enough in criticizing Japan’s decision
to tie itself to Hitler’s Germany.  To quote from pages 273–274:
... In 1940 the German Armies invaded Western Europe by a lightning war,
made a triumphant entry into Paris, and forced France to surrender.
Japan’s eyes were riveted on Germany’s victories in Europe.  Japan anticipated
that a Germany which had destroyed France would also defeat England, and in 1940
concluded, along with Italy, the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact.  By the Pact,
Japan could alleviate its feeling of isolation, but the military alliance with two distant
European countries did not have realistic utility.  In addition, it was a factor that
decisively deepened the opposition of America which supported England. 28)
In April 1941, Japan and the Soviet Union concluded the Japan-Soviet Union
Neutrality Treaty.  Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yo¯suke, who put together the two
treaties, sought to develop a Four Power [ Japan-Germany-Italy-Soviet Union]
Treaty.  He thought the pressure [that would result from such a treaty] would be
advantageous in advancing negotiations with the United States.  However, in June
1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the German-Soviet War began.
Matsuoka’s plans were crushed.
The first criticism to be leveled at this passage rests with the Tsukurukai ’s sterile
assertion that Japan entered the Tripartite Alliance to “alleviate its feeling of isolation.”
Perhaps such thinking did play a role in convincing Japanese policymakers of the virtue
of the alliance, but far more pressing concerns were at stake.  Principal among these was
Japan’s military-driven advance into Southeast Asia.  To borrow the words of historian
Stephen Pelz: “The conflict in Europe stripped from the British, French, and Dutch
colonies in East Asia what little protection they had enjoyed in the days of peace.” 29) In
this connection, the Tsukurukai inexplicably —— but perhaps not unexpectedly ——
neglected whatsoever to mention the fact that immediately prior to the conclusion of the
Tripartite Pact, Japanese troops undertook the first step in their nation’s southward
advance by marching into northern Indochina. 30)
Objections can also be raised concerning the Tsukurukai ’s account of Matsuoka’s
diplomatic vision.  Although the narrative is accurate, its silence on critical issues is
striking.  In particular, the Tsukurukai ’s assertion that Matsuoka’s envisioned Four Power
Treaty was conceived with an eye to strengthening Japan’s hand in its forthcoming
negotiations with the United States leaves the reader begging for more.  How, according
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to Matsuoka’s vision, would tying Japan’s fortunes to Germany, Italy, (and later the
Soviet Union) improve Japan’s bargaining position in negotiations with the United States?
Witness Article Three of the Tripartite Pact, which committed the signatories to “assist
one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three
contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or
the Sino-Japanese conflict.” 31) This was, as President of the Privy Council Hara
Yoshimichi noted, “a treaty of alliance with the United States as its target.” 32) By
presenting the United States with the threat of war against an overwhelming anti-
democratic front —— which, once the Soviet Union had been brought into the fold, would
stretch across the Eurasian continent —— Matsuoka hoped to cow the United States into its
isolationist shell.  This in turn would remove the one remaining obstacle to Japan’s
southward advance.  As he explained in an impromptu, off-the-record press conference
one day before he took office: “In the battle between democracy and totalitarianism the
latter adversary will without question win and will control the world.  The era of
democracy is finished and the democratic system bankrupt.” 33) The man’s audacity was
nothing short of breathtaking. 34)
The failure to make explicit the connection between the Tripartite Pact (and
Matsuoka’s envisioned Four Power Pact) and Japan’s aggressive intentions leaves ARK ’s
readership woefully uninformed regarding the Tsukurukai ’s criticism of the Pact for
having no “realistic utility.”  Nor, as the foregoing analysis suggests, is the directly
interconnected issue of American opposition to the Pact placed in its proper context.  The
Pact had no “realistic utility” because far from breaking Washington’s resolve, it steeled it.
The Pact had no “realistic utility” because in threatening the United States with the use of
force, it did not account for the fact that the force Japan could muster was merely a
fraction of that which the United States possessed.  The Pact had no “realistic utility”
because Japan’s alliance partners were in no way able to make up for that windfall.  The
Pact had no “realistic utility” because it pushed Japan —— now allied militarily to America’s
proxy enemy in Europe —— perilously close to an unwinnable war with the United States.
The Pact had no “realistic utility” because Matsuoka’s dream of drawing the Soviet
Union into the fold was never anything more than a dream.  None of these issues receive
treatment at the hands of the Tsukurukai.
The Japanese-American Negotiations, 1941
All of the falsely presented premises that underlie ARK ’s reconstruction of Japanese-
American relations in the aftermath of Konoe’s “new order” announcement are brought
out in full relief in its presentation of the Japanese-American negotiations of 1941.  To
quote from pages 274–275:
In spring 1941, the Japanese-American negotiations began in Washington for
the purpose of remedying the deteriorating Japanese-American relationship.  Japan,
for the purpose of avoiding war, approached the negotiations with great expectations
and America, which had cracked Japan’s secret diplomatic code ... led Japan into
negotiations that were advantageous to itself.
In July, Japanese naval forces resolutely occupied southern Indochina and
triumphantly entered Saigon.  Saigon was an important military point to make
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possible attacks on American territory in the Philippines, English territory in
Singapore, and Dutch Indonesian territory.  America, which aggravated this critical
feeling, counterattacked in July by freezing Japanese capital assets in the United
States and by prohibiting entirely oil exports to Japan.  Both the United States and
England held a conference in the Atlantic and proclaimed an Atlantic Charter that
strengthened their alliance, announced their war objectives, and decided to delay war
with Japan for two or three months.
The most immediately obvious objection to be raised in connection with this passage
concerns the Tsukurukai ’s selectivity in presenting the historical record.  Having stated ——
correctly —— that Japan sought to “avoid war,” the Tsukurukai conveniently neglect to tell
their readership that the United States also sought to avoid war.  This is a critical sin of
omission whose underlying intent —— if not already obvious —— becomes apparent with the
Tsukurukai ’s later assertion that President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill at the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 “decided to delay war with Japan for
two or three months.”  This is an outrageous departure from the historical record.
Churchill at the Atlantic Conference urged upon Roosevelt a joint declaration that “any
further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacific” would produce a situation in
which Britain and the United States “would be compelled to take countermeasures even
though these might lead to war.”  Roosevelt proposed instead to revive an earlier offer of
Indochinese neutrality, whereby if Japanese troops pulled out of Indochina, Washington
would seek to settle the remaining issues with Japan.  Only if and when the Japanese
failed to respond to this proposal and instead undertook further aggression, would
Roosevelt respond with measures that “might result in war between the United States and
Japan.” 35) In discussing the possibility —— or the increasing probability —— of war in the
Pacific, at no point did Roosevelt and Churchill agree to “delay war with Japan for two or
three months.”
Exposing this historical falsehood renders utterly meaningless the Tsukurukai ’s assertion
that the United States “led Japan into negotiations that were favourable to itself.”  This
assertion labours under the false premise that the United States entered the negotiations
intent on going to war with Japan.  By this reckoning, the United States determined to
delay the war’s opening in order to better prepare its own war machine while at the same
time maximising the toll that economic sanctions —— not to mention the ongoing war in
China —— exacted on Japan’s military forces.  To be sure, in the event that war did break
out, it was in American interests to delay that war as long as possible.  Contrary to the
Tsukurukai ’s conviction, however, the United States did not enter the negotiations intent
on war with Japan.  Even as the negotiations began, American military officers —— in
secret staff conversations with their British counterparts —— reached the fundamental
decision that if Japan entered the war, Germany’s defeat was still to be given priority over
that of Japan. 36) These were hardly the actions of a military machine champing for a fight
in the Pacific.  Indeed, Secretary of State Cordell Hull captured the sense of cautious hope
that pervaded Washington in early 1941 when he counselled Roosevelt to await
Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo¯’s forthcoming arrival, in the expectation that “he may
have some proposals and suggestions to offer.” 37) In other words, the United States
entered the negotiations in the belief that the possibility of conciliation with Japan 
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—— however slight —— still existed.
As far as American policymakers were concerned, the possibility of Japanese-American
conciliation rested on the willingness of their Japanese counterparts to drop their
adherence to a policy of military conquest.  This was entirely consistent with the policy to
which the United States adhered throughout the period under review.  That being the
case, it is difficult —— if not impossible —— to substantiate the Tsukurukai ’s claim that the
United States “led Japan into negotiations that were favourable to itself.”  Furthermore, in
light of the “great expectations” that Japan took into the negotiations —— expectations that
have received treatment earlier in this paper —— it is hard to see how it was led into
anything at all.  Perhaps this explains why the Tsukurukai fail to outline these “great
expectations.”  Suffice it here to note that, in his initial instructions to ambassador
Nomura, Matsuoka maintained that any understanding Japan might reach with the
United States would be predicated on Japan’s Tripartite Pact commitments, and its
ongoing pursuit of the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 38) In short,
Matsuoka was insisting that Washington must accept Japan’s desire to overrun Southeast
Asia.  “Great expectations” indeed, but they spelled disaster for the negotiations with the
United States.  As ambassador Nomura put it prior to his departure for Washington:
“There is no way we should think there is any chance of adjusting relations with the
United States while Japan and Germany are working hand in hand.” 39) Herein lies a
contradiction that the Tsukurukai are unwilling —— or unable —— to tackle: Japan’s
policymakers argued that they sought rapprochement with the United States, yet the
“great expectations” they carried into the negotiations of 1941 showed no inclination to
adopt a course that might facilitate such rapprochement.
As a parting shot at the idea that America “led Japan into negotiations,” it is instructive
to consider the policy perceptions informing the navy’s middle echelons at the outset of
the Japanese-American negotiations.  It is worth recalling in this connection that the
navy was bound to bear the brunt of a war with the United States, and hence held the key
to war in the Pacific.  In the autumn of 1940, a mid-level naval officer suggested: “Ever
since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, nay, even before then, [our nation] has
anticipated war with the United States.”  Yet the time was not yet ripe for war, for it was
first necessary to secure strategic provisions from “the enemy.”  In keeping with this
purpose, ambassador Nomura was to be “thrown as a bone to the United States.” 40)
Granted, the navy’s top echelons were not in agreement with these ideas —— at least
until June–July 1941 —— yet their prevalence amongst the navy’s middle ranking fire-eaters
rendered meaningful concessions to the United States out of the question.  At the same
time, in the absence of concessions, the state of American-Japanese relations could only
deteriorate, eventually to the point of war.  In this way, the ramblings of a mid-rank navy
hawk were a self-fulfilling prophecy.  At the very least, this quotation reveals that Japan
entered the negotiations with its eyes wide open —— there is certainly no evidence to
suggest that it was “led” into negotiating with the United States.
The final criticisms to be levelled at the above passage concern the Tsukurukai ’s
treatment of Japan’s “resolute occupation” of southern Indochina.  “Resolute” it may have
been, but it in no way squared with the negotiations playing out in Washington.  As
Nomura cabled Tokyo nearly three weeks prior to the occupation of Indochina: “If you
are resolved to use armed force against the Southern Regions at this time, there seems to
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be no room at all for adjusting Japanese-American relations.” 41) His sound judgement was
snubbed by his colleagues in Tokyo.  Even with the benefit of hindsight, the Tsukurukai
failed to see this self-evident truth, and instead made the bewildering —— and
unsubstantiated —— assertion that the United States “aggravated this critical situation.”
How the United States “aggravated” the situation is anybody’s guess —— Hitler’s assault on
the Soviet Union in late June would have seemed a more plausible candidate —— yet the
assertion fits neatly with the Tsukurukai ’s attempts to lay the blame for Pearl Harbor at
Washington’s feet. 42)
The final ARK passage under review is that which reconstructs the ultimate failure of
the Japanese-American negotiations.  To quote from page 275:
Japan, also, while giving thought to war against the United States continued its
diplomatic negotiations with America, but in November America’s Secretary of
State Cordell Hull thrust uncompromising proposals that were called the Hull Note
before the Japanese side.  The Hull Note demanded unconditionally Japan’s
immediate withdrawal from China.  Responding to this demand, the Japanese
government thought it had the meaning of surrendering to the United States and
finally made up its mind to begin war with the United States.
In this passage the Tsukurukai actively sought to create the impression of a Japan
pushed into a corner by the United States, and in particular by Secretary of State Hull.
To be sure, the Hull Note of 26 November was “uncompromising” —— as Hull himself
apparently understood.  Having delivered the note to ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu,
he told Secretary of the Army Henry L. Stimson, “I have washed my hands of [the
matter], it is now in the hands of you and [Secretary of the Navy Frank] Knox —— the
Army and the Navy.” 43) Yet the Tsukurukai ’s assertion that Japan to that point had
continued the negotiations “while giving thought to war against the United States” is a
masterful understatement.  As early as 6 September —— nearly three months prior to the
Hull Note —— Japan’s policymakers agreed: “In the event that there is no prospect of our
demands being met by the first ten days of October ... we will immediately decide to
commence hostilities against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.” 44) Prime
Minister Konoe’s resignation in October temporarily halted the momentum, although
again on 1 November the Japanese government —— some three weeks prior to the Hull
Note —— stipulated that should the Japanese-American negotiations prove unsuccessful,
then war would begin on 1 December. 45) At the same time, Japanese policymakers
never seriously considered making such concessions to the United States as might have
ensured those negotiations’ success. 46) Looking back on the failed negotiations a decade
after the event, Japan’s Foreign Ministry remarked simply: “Japan at the time should have
made difficult concessions.” 47) It is telling that even today the Tsukurukai appear unable to
make those concessions.
The above analysis has shown that the Tsukurukai have dispensed with both the
interpretations of historians and with the historical record itself in pursuit of their
ideologically-driven reconstruction of Japan’s pre-Pearl Harbor diplomatic history.  In
short, they have laid most —— if not all the blame —— for the Pacific War at the feet of the
United States.  Underlying this effort is a warped sense of recent Japanese history —— not
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as an aspect of human history, nor as part of the Asia-Pacific’s regional history —— but as
“national” history, to be used less as a tool of education than as a tool of indoctrination.
The Tsukurukai justify this effort with the facile insistence (as quoted at the outset of this
paper) that “it is impossible for nations to share historical perceptions.” 48) In thus
perverting the historical discipline, the Tsukurukai have replaced the traditional
historicizing question, “How it actually was?”  with the very different question, “How it
should be perceived?”  And it is for this, one hopes, they will be most remembered.
*Special thanks belong with Harry Wray for inviting me to participate on this panel.  My thanks also to
Takemoto To¯ru, whose challenging comments in his capacity as panel discussant served to strengthen this
essay immeasurably.  I am also indebted to Alan Rix, who helped to give this paper focus, and to
Denis Brosnan, whose skills as proofreader are unsurpassed.
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